github-read — read-only GitHub MCP server
A production-grade, read-only MCP server for the GitHub REST API. Wire it into Claude Desktop / Claude Code / Cursor and the agent can answer questions about repositories, issues, files, and users — without any write access.
Scaffolded by mcp-factory; the value is the production layer on top: auth-scoping, fail-soft, version-pinning, tests, docs.
Tools
| Tool | What it does | |---|---| | get_repo | Repo metadata: stars, language, open issues, default branch, license, last push | | list_issues | Open/closed/all issues (PRs filtered out), newest-update first | | get_file_contents | Read a UTF-8 text file at a path (truncates past ~100 KB) | | search_repositories | Search public repos by keyword/qualifiers | | get_user | Public profile for a user or org |
Install
cd github-read-mcp
python -m venv .venv
.venv/Scripts/python.exe -m pip install -r requirements.txt # Windows
# source .venv/bin/activate && pip install -r requirements.txt # macOS/Linux
Dependencies are version-pinned (requirements.txt); a fresh install reproduces the tested build.
Authentication & scoping (read this)
The token is optional:
- No token → the server runs on GitHub's unauthenticated 60 req/hr tier.
It works, but rate-limits quickly. It prints a one-line warning to stderr.
- With a token → 5000 req/hr. Use a **fine-grained personal access
token scoped to read-only**:
- Repository access: only the repos the agent should see (or "public repos").
- Permissions: Contents: Read-only and Metadata: Read-only. Nothing else.
This server only ever issues HTTP GETs — there is no tool that can write, delete, or mutate anything. Even if handed a broader token, it cannot take a destructive action. Grant the minimum anyway; least privilege is the point.
Set the token via the GITHUB_TOKEN env var (see registration below). Never commit a token.
Register in Claude / Cursor
Add to your MCP config (~/.claude.json under mcpServers, or Cursor's mcp.json):
{
"mcpServers": {
"github-read": {
"command": "C:\\path\\to\\github-read-mcp\\.venv\\Scripts\\python.exe",
"args": ["-m", "github_mcp.server"],
"env": { "GITHUB_TOKEN": "github_pat_xxx_your_readonly_token" }
}
}
}
The command must be the venv interpreter (so the pinned deps are on the path), and the working directory must be the repo root so -m github_mcp.server resolves. Leave GITHUB_TOKEN as "" to run unauthenticated. Restart the client to pick up the server.
Verify it works
# Hermetic unit/integration suite (no network, no token):
.venv/Scripts/python.exe -m pytest -q
# Live tests against the real unauthenticated GitHub API:
RUN_LIVE_GITHUB_TESTS=1 .venv/Scripts/python.exe -m pytest tests/test_live.py -v
# End-to-end MCP protocol smoke (spawns the server, drives it as a client would):
.venv/Scripts/python.exe scripts/smoke_mcp.py
Fail-soft behavior
Every failure mode returns a structured JSON envelope — a tool call never crashes the agent session:
{ "error": { "type": "rate_limited",
"message": "GitHub rate limit exhausted on the unauthenticated (60/hr) tier.",
"hint": "Set a GITHUB_TOKEN to raise the limit to 5000 req/hr.",
"retry_after_seconds": 118.4 } }
Handled: rate_limited, secondary_rate_limited, unauthorized, forbidden, not_found, invalid_request, is_directory, binary_file, timeout, network_error, bad_response, internal_error. A missing required argument is rejected by the MCP SDK itself (protocol-level isError) before it reaches the server.
Layout
github-read-mcp/
├── mcp.yaml # factory manifest (the deliverable spec)
├── github_mcp/
│ ├── server.py # MCP server: tools + fail-soft boundary
│ ├── client.py # GitHub client: auth, version-pin, fail-soft
│ ├── errors.py # error normalization
│ └── _scaffold_generated.py # original factory stub (provenance / before-after)
├── tests/ # 31 hermetic + 4 live (network-gated)
├── scripts/smoke_mcp.py # end-to-end MCP protocol smoke
├── requirements.txt # pinned runtime deps
└── requirements-dev.txt # pinned test deps





