evite-mcp
  
A Model Context Protocol server for Evite — read and act on your events as both guest (invitations received) and host (events you created): list events, view guest lists & RSVP tallies, RSVP, message guests, and create/edit events. Built on @chrischall/mcp-utils.
Status: read + write tools live. The five read tools work against Evite's internal API, authenticating from email/password (tier-1,
POST /ajax_login), a raw cookie env var, or a signed-in browser tab (fetchproxy bootstrap). The thirteen write tools are confirm-gated — withoutconfirm: truethey only return a dry-run preview and send nothing — and their endpoints are live-verified (seedocs/EVITE-API.md); a couple of request bodies are still assumed rather than captured (#3).
Tools
Six read tools (all read-only), thirteen confirm-gated write tools, plus evite_healthcheck:
| Tool | Endpoint | Returns | | --- | --- | --- | | evite_list_events | GET /services/events/v1/ | your events + a totals breakdown (filterBy = all/host/others, repeatable status, offset/numResults paging) | | evite_get_event | GET /services/event/v1/{id} | single-event detail (event, settings, location) | | evite_list_guests | GET /services/event/v1/{id}/guests/ | the guest list + RSVP responses (delivery status, views, short links) | | evite_rsvp_summary | (derived from guests) | just the RSVP summary (yes/no/maybe/noReply + head counts) | | evite_list_messages | GET /services/event/v1/{id}/posts/ | the event's Messages thread | | evite_list_templates | scrapes /invites/{category}/ | invitation template slugs (the template_name evite_create_event needs) + display names |
Write tools (confirm-gated)
Every write tool takes confirm: boolean. Without confirm: true it performs no network call and returns a dry-run preview of exactly what would be sent — that is the safe default. Only confirm: true reaches the live path. Endpoints are verified; the CSRF token (X-CSRFToken, read fresh per request as it rotates) is attached centrally.
| Tool | Endpoint | Action | | --- | --- | --- | | evite_rsvp | PUT /services/event/v1/{id}/guests/{guestId} | RSVP for a guest (response + adult/kid head counts + optional note) | | evite_send_message | POST /tsunami/v1/services/event/{id}/guest/{gid}/messages | send a private message to one guest (body assumed) | | evite_broadcast | POST /tsunami/v1/services/event/{id}/broadcast/ | broadcast a message to whole RSVP segments (virtual_groups) at once | | evite_upload_photo | POST …/photos/v1/{id}/upload/request/ → GCS → finish → shared-gallery | upload a local image to the event's shared photo album (4-step GCS signed upload) | | evite_create_event | POST /services/event/v1/ ({event:{…}}) | create an event draft (needs template_name; the API 500s even on success) | | evite_update_event | PATCH /services/event/v1/{id} ({event:{…}}) | edit an event (only the fields you pass change) | | evite_add_guest | POST /ajax/event/{id}/guestlist/draft/ | add guests to the draft (un-sent) list — [{name,email}] | | evite_update_guest | PATCH /ajax/event/{id}/guestlist/draft/ | edit a draft guest's name/email/phone | | evite_remove_guest | DELETE /ajax/event/{id}/guestlist/draft/{gid} | remove a draft guest | | evite_send | POST /services/event/v1/{id}/send/ | "Send now" — emails the ready-to-send guests | | evite_cancel_event | POST …/actions/cancel/ | cancel an event / delete a draft (destructive; reversible) | | evite_reinstate_event | POST …/actions/reinstate/ | reinstate a cancelled event | | evite_duplicate_event | GET /plus/create/{id}/copy/ (→302) | copy an event into a fresh draft; returns the new event id |
The authoring flow is evite_create_event → evite_add_guest → evite_send. evite_send, evite_send_message, evite_broadcast, and evite_cancel_event have real-world effects (emails / cancellation notices), so their confirm-gating matters.
Architecture
Fetchproxy-archetype MCP. Evite has no public API, so the server calls Evite's internal /services/ web API using your session. src/auth.ts resolves that session in priority order:
EVITE_EMAIL+EVITE_PASSWORD(tier-1, preferred) — headless email/password form login: POST the creds tohttps://www.evite.com/ajax_login, then build the session from the responseSet-Cookiejar (x-evite-session,evtsession,csrftoken,x-evite-features). No browser bridge, no hand-copied cookie. Both vars must be set, or the resolver falls through. (Live.)EVITE_SESSION_COOKIE— a rawcookie:header copied from a signed-inevite.comtab (or set in CI). Used verbatim. (Live.)- Fetchproxy bootstrap (fallback) — lift the session cookies (
x-evite-session,evtsession,x-evite-features,csrftoken) from a signed-inevite.combrowser tab via@fetchproxy/bootstrap. Bootstrap runs once; every API call then goes out via plain Nodefetch()with the cookies attached. Opt out withEVITE_DISABLE_FETCHPROXY=1. (Live.)
One tier is intentionally deferred (the resolver is shaped to slot it in):
- Fetchproxy as transport (bot-wall retry through the browser bridge) — a fallback only needed if plain
fetchtrips a wall; not observed during discovery.
The thirteen write tools (rsvp, add/update/remove-guest, send, send-message, broadcast, upload-photo, create/update/cancel/reinstate/duplicate event) are confirm-gated (dry-run preview unless confirm: true). The single private client.write() helper attaches the CSRF token via one centralized header (CSRF_HEADER = X-CSRFToken; the csrftoken cookie rotates mid-session, so it's read fresh per request). Endpoints span three bases — REST /services/…, the legacy /ajax/event/{id}/… guest list, and the /tsunami/… messaging service — all live-verified; a couple of request bodies remain assumed (#3).
Development
npm install # resolves @chrischall/mcp-utils from a local tarball (see issue #4)
npm run build
npm test
Docs & roadmap
- Design spec:
docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-31-evite-mcp-design.md - Plan 1 (scaffold + spike):
docs/superpowers/plans/2026-05-31-evite-mcp-scaffold-and-spike.md - Plan 2 (auth + read tools):
docs/superpowers/plans/2026-05-31-evite-mcp-auth-and-reads.md - Internal API reference (verified from a live session):
docs/EVITE-API.md
Open work: #3 — write endpoints + CSRF are now live-verified; only a couple of request bodies (send / send-message) remain assumed. #4 tracks publishing the shared lib. (Discovery #1, tier-1 email/password login #2, and the read tools are done.)
License
MIT






